The prominence of patronage has been evident from the beginning of this century in Moscow's rule over Chechnia through the intermediary Akhmad Kadyrov. Moreover, it has increased as a source of political power since president Akhmad Kadyrov was killed in 2004 and his son Ramzan Kadyrov inherited this position. Moscow became more and more inclined to govern Chechnia through a patron-client relationship between the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and the Head of Chechnia, Ramzan Kadyrov. Ramzan's firm rule over Chechnia itself has been attained through the extension of patronage practices into the organization of the security, political, and economic spheres. Judging by recent commentary on Russian affairs, these claims may look like pushing in wide open doors. 1 Moreover, the inner workings of Putin's Russia have already been convincingly conceptualized as personalistic, closed networks of patronage. 2 This article's ambition, however, is to go beyond stating the obvious, that patronage is important in Putin's relations with Kadyrov, and show how such relations acquire a local cultural imprint and how they are socially-constituted. My point of departure is that the current organizing principle in Moscow's relations with certain regions in the Russian Federation is best grasped by the concept of imperial hierarchy. Empires are characterized by rule through intermediaries and the existence of distinctive contractual relations between cores and their peripheries. 3 Within this larger understanding of Moscow's current relations with Chechnia as imperial, I suggest and substantiate the current distinct contractual relationship between the Russian center and Chechnia as one based on patronage informed by kinship. I argue that the Putin-Kadyrov relationship is a generic case of a patron-client connection, but highlight the local imprint that such bonds acquire by tracing how Chechen kinship practices inform this case. 4 It is kinship's role in social organization, as an ideational and practical resource in a larger collective setting that is studied here, not kinship as a set structure of blood relations. 5 The tentative answer to the question of how patronage informed by kinship has become relevant and why Machine
it prevails builds on the claim that social use and practice has a recursive effect on such relations. Like all social relationships, patron-client bonds informed by kinship are confirmed and strengthened by being exercised. 6 More specifically, they prevail because they are cultivated from above via private practices of personal recruitment, direct appointment, non-formal communication, and resource allocation, but also because they are constituted as the legitimate bond between rulers, intermediaries, and people through public practices, both linguistic and material.
In the first section of this article, the claim that Moscow's current relations with Chechnia are best understood as imperial is substantiated. The stage is set for enquiring into how patronage informed by kinship has become the essence of this distinctive contractual relationship. Then the article continues by revisiting the heritage of kinship in Chechen social and political life before it moves on to illustrate how Akhmad Kadyrov's fragile rule, and through him Russia's imperial rule of Chechnia, was re-established through a patron-client relationship informed by kinship. The third section investigates in more detail how Putin's patronage over Ramzan Kadyrov is substantiated through the exchange of gifts between patron and client, but also how it is constituted and sustained through public linguistic and material practices that affirm kinship as well as other Chechen cultural codes. In the fourth section I show how formal federal relations and ties between Russia and Chechnia have waned as Kadyrov's sovereignty over Chechnia has increased and question the balance of power in the father-son relationship that has developed between Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov. Finally, in the conclusion I point to the challenges such a relationship poses for Moscow's rule over the Russian Federation as a whole. 6 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor, 2006) .
What Kind of Rule and How is it Established?
With the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the Russian presidency, analyzing centerperiphery relations through conceptualizations of Russia as a "federative system" has lost currency. 7 As of today, there are also obvious differences in how Moscow governs the eighty-five federal subjects (including Sevastopol and Crimea) that make up the Russian Federation. Chechnia is in many ways an "outlier" compared to the other regions. The ideal-typical concept of empire that receives much attention in the current international relations debate clearly has particular relevance if we zoom in on this one center-periphery relation. Moscow's rule over this tiny republic conforms nicely with classical and more recent conceptualizations of imperial relations.
Building on Max Weber, Michael Doyle, and Ronald Grigor Suny, George Steinmetz defines empires as "political organizations that are expansive, militarized, and multinational, and that place limits on the sovereignty of the polities in their periphery." 8 The classical definitions of empire tend to underline the hierarchical, inequitable relationship between the metropole and a disadvantaged 7 Helge Blakkisrud, The Governor's Last Stand: Federal Bargaining in Russia's Transition to Appointed Regional Heads, 2005 -2009 (Oslo, 2015 , Paul J. Goode, The Decline of Regionalism in Putin's Russia: Boundary Issues (Milton Park, 2011), Jeffrey Kahn, Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia (Oxford, 2002) , Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia (Manchester, 2002) . 8 George Steinmetz "Empires and Colonialism," http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756384/obo-9780199756384-0090.xml (no longer available); Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, 1978) ; Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, 1986); Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, "National" Identity, and Theories of Empire," in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations:
Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford, 2001) , 23-66. periphery, as well as the role of intermediaries. 9 Expanding on this, more recent scholarly work emphasizes the diversity between the units in the periphery and the techniques imperial regimes use to regulate such diversity. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, for example, argue that empires, in contrast to nation states, seek to reproduce difference in the periphery rather than cultivate sociocultural homogenization. 10 In a similar vein, Daniel Nexon suggests that empires are composite arrangements that rely extensively on "rule through intermediaries" and are characterized by patterns of government in which the center subordinates communities through "heterogeneous contracting between imperial cores and constituent political communities." 11 As we shall see below, there is little doubt that Moscow's rule over Chechnia through the Kadyrovs is an example of the ideal-typical "rule through intermediaries." Moreover, the social contract through which Chechnia has been subordinated to Moscow since the beginning of this century has been distinct and different from those that bind other federal subjects to Moscow, mainly because Chechnia was the only subject that sought independence from Moscow and attempted to secede after the Soviet Union came apart. In the terms of Suny, we could say that the Second Chechen War was an "imperial project" proper, involving the establishment of full sovereignty by a center over a distinct and subordinate 9 "Empire is a particular form of domination or control between two units set apart in a hierarchical, inequitable relationship, more precisely a composite state in which a metropole dominates a periphery to the disadvantage of the periphery," in Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out," 25. periphery. 12 On the heels of the second Chechen War, a distinct contract between the federal center and Chechnia developed through the Putin/Kadyrov axis, as I argue here, built on kinship-informed patronage. This, along with the fact that there is little connection between Chechnia and other subjects in the periphery of the Federation makes it a good example of the "hub-and-spoke system of authority" typical of empires. According to Andrew Phillips, vertical integration (between center and periphery) and horizontal segregation (between imperial segments) form imperial statecraft's two interlinked imperatives. 13 The task here will be to enquire into how vertical incorporation has been achieved in the case of Chechnia and show how patronage informed by kinship has come to constitute the content of the distinctive contract between the Russian center and Chechnia.
As Nexon notes "empires face specific problems of legitimating their control . . . Empires often best navigate these cross pressures by engaging in 'multivocal' or 'polyvalent' signaling: by projecting different identities and commitments to discrete audiences." 14 Elaborating on this, Phillips suggests that hubs, such as Moscow, acquire power over subordinate communities, such as Chechnia, by relying on indirect rule and by building on and incorporating local ideas and normative resources. The making of the bond between the imperial core and the subordinate communities is hard work and necessitates extensive imperial intervention to modify existing collective identities to conform to imperial designs. "The curatorship of collective identities," Phillips suggests, "through customization practices involving that the appropriation, adaptation and reorganization of indigenous 12 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations," Post-Soviet Affairs 11, no. 2 (1995): 193-94. 13 Andrew Phillips, "Making Empires: Hierarchy, Conquest and Customization," in Ayşe Zarakol, ed., Hierarchies in World Politics (Cambridge, Eng., 2017), 43-65. 14 Nexon, The Struggle of Power in Early Modern Europe, 254. Also, Burbank and Cooper emphasize that modern empires have to exercise "responsive rule" over the populations they seek to govern; see their chapter 10. ideational resources to shore up imperial authority-has historically been key to the business of empire building." 15 Phillips theorizes the process of building imperial relations as conscious and top-down.
Customization practices involve two processes, according to Phillips. Empire builders undertake creative initiatives that are productive for the categories of difference among subject groups; they differentiate and define these groups. Then in the next phase, empire builders institutionalize them by inscribing them into practices of imperial governance. 16 The case studied in this article suggests that less conscious and top down processes are at work, wherein the initiatives from the subject group seem to define as much those from the empire builder's hand. Moreover, the ideational resources in the subject group place clear limits on creativity in the center. Therefore, this account will start from "the bottom up" by looking at kinship in the Chechen subject group. As Jeppe Mulich notes, state transformation in historical colonialism was sometimes driven by colonizers and imperial administrators, who claimed territories and created new institutions. Other parts of state transformation, however, were driven by the very people facing potential incorporation by outside forces: in attempting to stave off such incursions, they refashioned their own polities and political institutions. 17 Whether the process is more bottom up or top down, the result in terms of an imperial relationship is fairly similar. Through processes of customization, "traditional" local intermediaries are empowered and become critical brokers linking the center to the subordinate community and the basis for the narrow compacts between the imperial elite and the intermediary are laid. At the same time, certain forms of collective identities are frozen in place, making anti-imperial mobilization less 15 Phillips, "Making Empires: Hierarchy, Conquest and Customization," 48-49. 16 Ibid., 50-51. probable. 18 The fundamental and underlying understanding is always that neither the imperial center nor the subordinate community can be understood as pre-existing social units. This implies that the Putin-Kadyrov relationship analyzed below should not be considered as hinging on a static copy of Chechen kinship, but as a dynamic reinvention. The explicit argument throughout what follows in the next sections is that the Chechen "difference"-kinship-informs the social basis of the current Putin-Kadyrov patron-client relationship and the Russo-Chechen imperial compact more generally.
Recent literature on the workings of the Russian political system successfully capture currentday center-periphery relations based on informal networks in conceptualizations such as sistema or patronal politics. 19 As laid out in the work of Alena Ledeneva or Henry Hale, the more secret and isolated machinations of informal networks of personal acquaintance in the Russian polity, for example, are crucial to our understanding of its inner workings. Other articles document well the prevalence of such relations in Russia. 20 This literature, however, as well as, for example, the classical work on the internal relations of the Soviet ruing bureaucracy by Henry Rigby, fails to explain how these relations are socially-constituted. 21 It disregards the fact that the actors in patronal networks also are social actors embedded in a larger social context: they legitimize their actions and 18 Gorbachev (Aldershot, Eng., 1990) .
relations not only within these networks, but also before a larger audience in the Russian polity. 22 Hale has presented patronal politics as the opposite of what Benedict Anderson captured in his concept of "imagined communities." 23 He then explains Putin's embrace of nationalism in 2014 merely as an isolated event, an instrumental move to shore up a potential crack in "machine politics." 24 This article works from the understanding that Putin has always needed to speak and cater to certain "rhetorical common places" among the members in patronal networks, as well as to such ideational resources in the wider communities he has sought to govern. 25 This has probably been particularly crucial when trying to establish personal acquaintance with persons with a very different social and cultural background (such as the Kadyrovs), and through such persons to rule over a community that has been subjected to war by the Russian center twice since 1991. By building on the recent contributions to the literature on empires laid out above, the account below will show that the patron-client relationship of Putin and Kadyrov is not only of a closed, personal nature, but built on locally-embedded collectives and constantly changing kinship practices. More generally, the account will enlarge our understanding of how the bonds within patronal networks are established socially and how they are legitimized and communicated to a wider yet discrete community.
Heritage and the Building of Patronage over Chechnia
During the Russian colonization of the Caucasus, the mountain peoples of the northeastern Caucasus were last to give in. Organized in independent clans but united under the slogan of Gazavat (Holy 22 On legitimation, see Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy. 23 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983) . war against Christian colonization) and the leadership of Imam Shamil, Chechens, Avars and other Muslim peoples in the region withstood Russian imperial power until 1864. 26 Ever since, what we today refer to as Chechnia has formally been part of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Russian Federation, although with different administrative borders and labels attached. Despite this formal attachment, lower-level Chechen social organization has been continuously informed by ideas and practices of kinship. In addition to the clan (taip), many years of Gazavat during colonization resulted in the emergence of another social structure informed by kinship, often overlapping the clan, namely the Sufi brotherhoods (vird). 27 Although they did not stay the same, taips and virds survived Soviet times as organizing principles in Chechen society.
While formal political, and to some extent, also the so-called traditional kinship practices broke down before and during the First Chechen War (1994) (1995) (1996) , other social structures based on ideas of kinship shaped Chechen society in war. Prime amongst these was a group of independent but connected warlords. Each of these warlords commanded a group of men that often, but not always, came from the same village and were related through practices of kinship. The efficiency, loyalty, and dedication that such an organization inspired was a key asset for the Chechen forces in their war against Russia and goes a long way in explaining their military victory. When elections were held in January 1997, the Chechen commander-in chief, Aslan Maskhadov, who was the mastermind behind the Chechen victory in Grozny in August 1996, was elected president and head of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria. But even as president in "peacetime," Maskhadov sought to exert power via kinship-informed patronage instead of strengthening formal state institutions: the practice of appointing members of the war-time resistance, his "brothers in arms," prevailed in his 26 John F. Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London, 1908) . 27 A taip is an extended family network that originates and develops from one or several tribal villages, so-called auls, in Anna Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom: The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus (New York, 2010), 14-20. cabinet of ministers. His rule as head of the Ichkerian state was from the very beginning conditioned and limited by the continued existence of groups of fighters that were loyal primarily to their particular warlords. 28 According to Charles Fairbanks, Maskhadov's position increasingly resembled that of medieval kings in their struggles with the great vassals, "because they were kings, they had more responsibilities, which they often could discharge only by giving someone part of the royal estate." 29 Maskhadov frequently had to buy the warlords' support by cutting into Ichkeria's resources Kadyrov's social standing and power at the time of his appointment was marginal. 33 In Chechnia, the appointment triggered a final exclusion of Kadyrov from the circle of former brothers-in-arms.
Perceived as a traitor, there had already been several attempts on his life and now Maskhadov publicly named him a "traitor," "an enemy of the Chechen people," and called for the death penalty against him. 34 According to Kadyrov, his administration had no control to speak of apart from an agent in every village. In Chechnia he trusted nobody but "his own," and even these he was not quite sure of. 35 In the Russian center, few but Vladimir Putin supported him, and Putin's choice of Kadyrov was probably based on the latter's self-centered opportunism, a quality that is characteristic for the members of the Russian sistema. 36 all down to the last man, as long as I am not killed or shot myself. I will kill as long as I live." 44 The loyalty to kin and obligation to revenge were to become core rationales behind the ensuing build-up of forces loyal to Ramzan in Chechnia. They also became core features of the relationship between the Russian ruler and the new Chechen middleman.
The Substantiation of Putin's Patronage over Chechnia
Putin's choice of ruling Chechnia through Akhmad's son Ramzan reflected not only his degree of dependency on Kadyrov for strategic control over Chechnia, but also the need to play to the particular Chechen difference. From the very beginning, the relationship was publicly framed as being of a private, even intimate nature and each side made commitments to the other with reference to family bonds. In a TV-interview, Ramzan re-called his first meeting with Putin in the Kremlin the same day that his father was killed:
Imagine, I was a young man, twenty-six or twenty-seven years. I didn't even understand why he invited me there. I saw that Putin was very emotionally upset (clip where Putin with Ramzan dressed in a sports suit by his side announces the death of Chechen president Akhmad Kadyrov, noting that the slain Chechen president "took responsibility for his nation with honor and courage") . . . he said he looked upon my Dad as a friend, as someone close, as a comrade-in-arms, as someone he could rely on . . . those were his words. I asked him to give me the opportunity to continue the war, to let me continue to fight against the terrorists, 44 "Рамзан Кадыров рассказал журналу GQ, что такое военный стиль, что и дальше будет убивать и что Путин-красавчик [Ramzan Kadyrov told the journal GQ what martial style is, that he will continue to kill and that Putin is a beauty]," Novosti NEWSru.com, October 5, 2005, at http://www.newsru.com/russia/05oct2005/kadyrov.html (last accessed January 24, 2017.) Author's translation.
the terrorists and the extremists. And he promised, I will give you this task . . . and we fought, we continued, with weapons in our hands . . . and then we built this (pointing to beautiful high arch in a new building in Grozny where the interview was shot). 45 Whether such recollections provide the correct version of "what actually happened" is beside the point. The crucial thing is that this bond between ruler and middleman was constituted and confirmed publicly as a kinship-like bond through words and images, also from Putin's side. There is not even an attempt to frame the relationship as formal. Rather, it was publicly presented as one of personal proximity and indebtedness. It is also noteworthy how Putin in his short summation of Akhmad's achievements ticks the boxes of the two prime virtues in Chechen society: honor and courage, and then endorses Ramzan's request to lead the violent fight against the terrorists. Such merger of Chechen kinship and cultural codes into the new Russo-Chechen compact is not an isolated episode. Playing to kinship and martial duty has been a constant when Ramzan and Putin address the public. 46 In an interview with Putin, the interviewer starts by referring to a statement by Ramzan that he is personally indebted to Putin for his life and then asks Putin how he conceives of this relation. Putin answers: "I look upon him as a son, we have in recent years developed friendly, really friendly, personal relations and I am convinced, this has played a tremendously positive role in claimed that Ramzan takes one third of the budget for himself. 50 Thus, the personal appointment of Ramzan and the bond created between him and Putin after Akhmad's death was strengthened and upheld by the allocation of resources directly to Ramzan. While such allocations create loyalty to and dependency on the patron at the individual level, they simultaneously, through the physical rebuilding of the destroyed Chechen capital, contribute to reshaping the collective image of Russian rule from killer to benefactor among the Chechens, making patronage more acceptable.
Apart from the flow of money that Ramzan was allowed to tap into, a flow of arms was directed into Ramzan's private army. When the Kadyrovtsy were legalized as Interior Ministry units in 2004, it provided a basis for financing and supplying them with arms. This also happened with several other units of forces which were given different formal names and were armed by the federal center, but which in reality were paramilitary entities subordinate to Ramzan. 51 As Kimberly Marten notes, these changes did not necessarily signal increased federal control over Chechnia. 52 battalion fought in South Ossetia on the Russian side. 56 Similar services were offered during the war in Ukraine. Inspecting 20,000 fully-armed Chechen soldiers on the December 28, 2014 in the Belimkhan sport complex in Grozny (with Putin overlooking from posters), Ramzan explained that each of them received an order saying that today they will depart to fulfil a military order given by the Supreme Commander . . . decisions are made by the Supreme Commander, we are just checking how we are prepared to fulfil assigned tasks. I think we will be glad to fulfil any order. We are ready to deploy to any place in the world that the President may ask us to go. I have no doubt that we will not upset him and will fulfil his order 100% . . . all of them are ready to voluntarily fulfil any order of the Supreme Commander any place in the world. 57
When Ramzan offers his services to Putin he publicly confirms his own, and through him It is thus fair to suggest that the Russo-Chechen compact that has developed since 1999 is a narrow bargain and has a distinctive content. It hinges on a patronal connection between Putin and Ramzan involving the private exchange of appointments and resources. But this connection is also built, sustained, and legitimized to a wider audience though public words, images, and practices expressing family, loyalty, honor, and martial bravery at the core of the relationship. While these are not the cultural codes that Chechens used to know but rather a merger and a compromise, the codes of the sub-ordinate community have made a strong imprint on the current compact. Moreover, Russia's imperial attempt has been more generative for Kadyrov than destructive.
The Surge of Client Power
Putin's success in subordinating Chechnia through kinship-informed patronage has its price. The Russian federal state has gradually ceded its monopoly on the use of force in this Russian territory.
Through presidential decrees issued in February and August 2006, the regional Interior Ministry forces controlled by Ramzan were given "direct leadership" over all counterterrorist activities in the North Caucasus, implying total operational dominance over federal Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry forces in Chechnia. 61 In line with Kadyrov's wishes, 20,000 Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnia in connection with the abolishment of the counter-terrorism regime in 2009. In October 2009, command over operational headquarters in Chechnia was transferred from the federal Interior Ministry to the regional FSB, which was led by a Chechen, Aleksandr Sulimov. 62 Kadyrov's claim to total and exclusive sovereignty over Chechen territory was amply illustrated in his April 61 Marten, 117. 62 Mairbek Vatchagaev, "FSB Assigned Control Over Operations in Chechnya and the North incidents that have taken place along the trail of these men are related to Ramzan's efforts to establish full control over Chechnia and take revenge on "critics" and "traitors." Judging by the cases that have come to light in the Russian press, Ramzan's people can act with impunity and are out of reach for federal courts and security agencies. 67
The paradox of the current Russo-Chechen compact and the particular shape it has acquired is particularly visible if we study the role that Ramzan has taken on as the Russian president's personal The extension of Ramzan's rule in in the North Caucasus, enabled through his military force and competency, was evident during the entire Medvedev presidency. As Aglaya Snetkov notes: "the Kadyrov regime tried to claim a role for itself in shaping the direction and implementation of regional counterterrorist operations across the rest of the North Caucasus." 68 In the larger picture of Moscow's rule over the Russian Federation, the biggest problem with today's imperial form of rule over Chechnia is that it is not only distinctive and narrow, but also unique. The evolution of the Russo-Chechen compact since the beginning of this century has consolidated certain cultural practices. Through Moscow's cultivation of the Kadyrovs and the Kadyrovtsy, the Chechens have been reinvented as a "martial race." Moreover, they have become even more inclined to connect and act within and through their own networks of trusted kin. In this, the Chechen "difference" within the Russian Federation has been transformed and amplified. Such cultivation of distinctive regional identities and practices could have been a "useful" setup for Moscow if it were replicated in relation to other subordinate communities in the Federation in an "effective" hub and spoke system, as they were in the British Empire, and indeed in early Soviet times. It would give ample room to divide and rule, because the subordinate communities in the periphery could not unite. Nevertheless, in the current system, where only one subordinate community has been given such a distinctive, narrow contract, Moscow does not have such opportunities. Indeed, one could argue that the most distinctive collective contractual relations in today's Russia beyond the more private relations inside the patronal networks are between Putin and the Russian population (a much broader community that spans across regional borders) and between Putin and the federal security 73 Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, 10-11. agencies (a community that spans across regional borders and has been at war with Chechnia and Kadyrov for more than two decades). 74 The brazen murder of Nemtsov in February 2015 is a logical extension of the Russo-Chechen compact and Ramzan's martial obligations within this compact. After all, the liberal oppositionist people. Still, we need to understand who these people are. I am not even mentioning here that people in the Caucasus are hotheads. Therefore, it is not easy for these people to learn to serve as high-ranking government officials. We are all human, we all have our past. However, I believe that the head of Chechnia and the heads of other Russian regions will understand the level and degree to which they are liable to the people living on the territories they govern and to Russia in general. They must understand that extreme actions or radical statements regarding opponents do not lead to greater stability in the country. On the contrary, this is detrimental to stability. Once they understand this, and I am confident that they will as they are sincerely committed to serving national interests, there will be no statements of this kind.
It may also be that there were omissions on my behalf in this respect. 75 75 Putin, "Direct Line with Vladimir Putin."
